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Support for entrepreneurship is widely seen as a mechanism to facilitate prosperity and 
peace in a growing number of post-conflict states. In this paper I critically evaluate this 
view. I argue that entrepreneurship is a ubiquitous quality in post-conflict states but not 
necessarily always for the good. Unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship may 
inhibit the resurgence of the private sector and might even cause a relapse into conflict. 
To limit unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship there are at least six dimensions 
which need to be taken into consideration, namely: the context of war, the relationship 
between institutions and entrepreneurship, the role played by ethnic/immigrant 
(minority) entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs in diaspora, the scope of the market, human 
and financial capital requirements, and appropriate forms of government support. 
Further research on entrepreneurship in post-conflict states is needed to overcome the 
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1 Introduction 
Security and prosperity eludes a large number of countries and their citizens, with 
almost a billion people living in countries that have in recent times been described as 
fragile, and even failed, states. In these states, the lack and/or unwillingness of 
governments to sustainably promote the progressive realization of security and 
prosperity is widely recognized as both cause and symptom of the perpetuation of 
poverty and conflict.1 Although a significant number of these countries are still engaged 
in conflict, the total number of conflicts across the world, and particularly in Africa,2 
has been declining (Ndulu et al. 2007). A growing number of people in fragile states are 
entering post-conflict eras, and are having high expectations of economic development, 
not only to improve their material conditions, but also to consolidate and ensure 
sustainable peace. It is not surprising therefore that, in a context wherein state capacity 
is often lacking, and liberalization and other market-oriented reforms dominate the 
agenda (Addison 2001: 12), there are high expectations that entrepreneurship can make 
an important contribution towards economic growth and development (Baumol et al. 
2007: 133). Calls for the development of entrepreneurship in poor and post-conflict 
states are often accompanied by claims that much of the difficulties that countries face 
are due to a lack of entrepreneurship (e.g. Iyigun and Rodrik 2004: 1-2; Munshi 
2007: 1)3 caused by a macroeconomic environment that discourages entrepreneurship 
(Schulpen and Gibbon 2002: 1).  
 
Is it true that entrepreneurship can contribute to peace and prosperity in post-conflict 
states, and that the problem is one of a lack of entrepreneurship? In this paper I provide 
critical answers to these questions. I suggest that the concept of ‘entrepreneurship’ is 
perhaps too loosely used in the context of these countries, and show that a more 
nuanced understanding of what is meant by entrepreneurship would suggest that first, 
entrepreneurship is an ubiquitous quality in fragile and post-conflict states and therefore 
not lacking as some would claim, and second, that entrepreneurship may in itself be 
contributing to, and contributing from, the very conflict and poverty for which   
entrepreneurship is being prescribed as a panacea. Moreover, in this view the 
establishment of peace, the achievement of political and economic stability, will not 
automatically result in the appearance of growth-oriented entrepreneurial ventures4 (see 
                                                 
1   There are a number of related definitions of fragile states. DFID defines fragile states as those where 
‘government cannot or will not deliver the core functions to its people’ (Vallings and Moreno-Torres 
2005: 4). The CIFP (2006: 3) defines fragility as ‘the extent to which a state can or cannot provide the 
basic functions of governance to its population’. The World Bank (2006) defines fragile states as those 
low-income countries that they had previous described as under ‘stress’ (LICUS). These are ‘countries 
with weak policies, institutions, and governance’. USAID (2005) sees fragile states as those in which 
the government is ‘unable or unwilling to adequately assure the provision of security and basic 
services to significant portions of their populations, and where the legitimacy of the government is in 
question’.  
2   The number of wars in Africa, though high, peaked in 1992, and since then a growing number of 
countries have been making the transition for war to peace (Ndulu et al. 2007: 111).  
3   According to Iyigun and Rodrik (2004: 1-2) ‘a key obstacle to growth in low-income environments is 
an inadequate level of entrepreneurship in non-traditional activities’.  
4   Even the achievement of the so-called peace dividend is not a foregone conclusion in post-conflict 
societies. Collier (1999) shows that there is no automatic peace dividend from the end of a civil war,   2
also Schramm 2004: 10). If one takes the implied and more limiting view that only 
certain kinds of entrepreneurial activity is good for peace and prosperity, say 
productive, pro-poor entrepreneurship, then the question arises how can such 
entrepreneurship contribute towards ensuring peace and development? And if the right 
conditions can be created for productive, pro-growth entrepreneurship to flourish, what 
is the prognosis for private sector resurgence in these fragile states?  
 
Concluding that there are various channels through which productive and pro-growth 
entrepreneurship, as well as survivalist (necessity) entrepreneurship can play a role in 
security and prosperity, and that the prognosis for entrepreneurial resurgence in post-
conflict states is good, I move on to discuss the various factors that need to be 
considered in creating conditions for the allocation of entrepreneurship towards 
productive, pro-growth activities. Entrepreneurship in developing countries is a 
relatively under-researched phenomenon. Lingelbach et al. (2005: 1) recently pointed 
out ‘Entrepreneurship in developing countries is arguably the least studied significant 
economic and social phenomenon in the world today’. This and the resulting lack of 
sufficient data on entrepreneurship in these countries complicate the discussion on 
policy responses to promote pro-growth entrepreneurship. Given this lack, I approach 
the task by considering various strands of literature through the lenses of 
entrepreneurship theory and empirics, in particular the strand of literature on the 
economic transition of countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE-
FSU), and the strands of literature on Africa’s economic performance (and in particular 
its firm performance). 
 
I conclude that there are six dimensions that need to be taken into consideration in 
creating better conditions for the right type of entrepreneurship to emerge in post-
conflict countries. First, the context of war and conflict which characterize many fragile 
states, or that preceded peace agreements, needs to be understood, as this environment 
may not only contain the seeds of its future destruction, but also an understanding of the 
incentives that affect the behaviour of various sources of entrepreneurship. Second, the 
relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship, and the evolution of institutional 
reform need to be better understood. Third, particular characteristics of entrepreneurship 
in poor and conflict countries need to be taken into consideration, in particular the role 
played by ethnic/immigrant (minority) entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs in diaspora. 
Fourth, attention needs to be given to the scope of the market in these countries, 
particularly so in the light of the dominance of small businesses (not in itself 
synonymous with entrepreneurship). Fifth, human and financial capital requirements are 
critical inputs into the entrepreneurial process, but the kind and type of requirements 
cannot easily be transplanted from other contexts or countries. Finally, the relationship 
between government and the private sector in fragile post-conflict states needs to be put 
on an appropriate footing, argued to be that of a developmental state, wherein 
governments remove barriers to business development, provide support on the input 
side of the entrepreneurial process and decentralize the provision of support measures 
and economic decision-making as much as possible. 
                                                                                                                                               
and that there could also be a ‘war overhang effect’. Whichever effect holds may depend on the length 
of the preceding war, with longer wars more likely to result in a peace dividend as it would have 
allowed for desired adjustments to the capital stock in face of the uncertainties that the very 
occurrence of war in the first place had created.   3
2 Defining  entrepreneurship 
In the previous section I alluded to the possibility that the term ‘entrepreneurship’ may 
be loosely used in the context of fragile and post-conflict states, but did not offer a 
definition of ‘entrepreneurship’. The reason is that a separate discussion on the 
definition or concept of entrepreneurship is required, since a distinction needs to be 
made between the definition of entrepreneurship as it is, and how it ought to be (for 
policy objectives). Different understandings of the terms might lead to different policy 
implications, so that it becomes important to understand what should be seen as 
entrepreneurship in fragile states, and states emerging from conflict.  
 
In this section I therefore first distinguish between productive, unproductive, and 
destructive entrepreneurship in the context of fragile and post-conflict states, pointing 
out that in its broadest sense substantial entrepreneurial activity characterize these 
states. Second, I distinguish between entrepreneurship, or entrepreneurial ventures, and 
small businesses, noting that in the context of fragile and post-conflict states an 
emphasis on small business may be important, and that policymakers should understand 
the dynamics of firm size and development. Moreover, I argue that the creation of new 
businesses—i.e. firm start-ups—may perhaps be even more important than existing 
firms for development and growth in post-conflict states.  
2.1  Productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurship 
There are many different definitions of entrepreneurship (see Davidsson 2004: 1). 
Wennekers and Thurik (1999: 30) identify thirteen distinct roles of an entrepreneur. 
More broadly, however, entrepreneurship is seen as involving either/or risk-taking, 
innovation, arbitrage, and co-ordination of production factors in the creation of a new 
business. (Fogel et al. 2006: 542). An example of this view is Hart (2003: 5) who 
defines entrepreneurship as ‘the process of starting and continuing to expand new 
businesses’. 
 
Entrepreneurs in post-conflict states perform all of these functions. As will be shown 
below (Section 3) risk-taking and arbitrage (being a ‘middleman’) are important 
functions during early stages of development. However, as an enlightening definition 
that assists in understanding the persistence of certain forms of economic activities in 
fragile and conflict /post-conflict states, the definition of entrepreneurship by Baumol 
(1990: 987) is preferable. Accordingly, ‘Entrepreneurs are defined, simply, to be 
persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, 
power, and prestige’.  In this definition, entrepreneurship is a quality that is always 
present in any country or population, and all that changes is the particular allocation or 
application of that quality. Thus entrepreneurship can be channelled into productive, 
unproductive (e.g. rent-seeking), or even destructive (e.g. illegal) activities (Baumol 
1990: 895). As such entrepreneurship in itself is not necessarily always a positive force 
in an economy. Wong et al. (2005) using empirical evidence from 37 countries 
participating in the 2002 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor finds significant evidence for 
‘the existence of entrepreneurial activities that do not contribute to economic growth’. 
Baumol (1990: 894) moreover goes further and remarks ‘at times the entrepreneur may 
even lead a parasitical existence that is actually damaging to the economy’. To make the 
moral position regarding entrepreneurship even more ambiguous, destructive 
entrepreneurship may differ from context to context and from position of the observer, 
and might, depending on the position, even have a positive impact on economic growth   4
in a country. Baumol (1990: 904) refers to the links between growth and warfare in 
Middle Age Europe, and in the ‘unprecedented prosperity enjoyed afterwards by the 
countries on the losing side of the Second World War’. Ruttan (2006) argues that much 
of the USA’s growth since 1945 could have been due to technologies emerging from 
war contexts. Nafzinger (2006: 16) describes how foreign firms and entrepreneurs have 
played an active role in many African conflicts by keeping elites in power and providing 
essential state services such as security, and moreover finding it in their interest to 
weaken local government capacity (see also Cooper 2006). ‘Destructive’ 
entrepreneurship might have positive effects on development, either over time or in 
other economies. Even during periods of war and conflict there is evidence of 
substantial entrepreneurship at work, fulfilling a threefold role in sourcing funds to 
sustain conflicts, overcoming the adverse impacts of conflict, and exploiting profitable 
opportunities arising from conflict. Addison (2001: 7) notes that during the 
Mozambican 18-year civil war, private entrepreneurs continued to supply the 
government army with much of its food requirements. In Colombia, the FARC 
developed social safety nets for coca farmers and combatants in the forms of minimum 
wages and pensions (Cooper 2006: 20). In Sri Lanka, the rebel Tamil Tigers manage to 
generate between US$200 million and US$350 million annually for expenditure in its 
civil war (Collier et al. 2006: 5). Nenova (2004) documents the inventiveness of 
entrepreneurs in Somalia, where government is almost absent, and where five private 
airline carriers emerged after the collapse of the state and the national airline in 1991 
(Pineau 2005: B02). In Liberia, the warlord Charles Taylor used patronage to create an 
own currency, a banking system, telecommunications network, airfields and a 
deepwater port for in the territory under his control (Nafzinger 2006: 16). Many war 
participants, including rulers, warlords, and smugglers—described by Cooper (2006) as 
‘conflict entrepreneurs’—develop substantial business interests.5 This not only makes 
the achievement of peace in many cases difficult (as these participants profit more from 
war than peace) but will also have a significant impact on the post-conflict economic 
success. This is because many wartime entrepreneurial activities provide capital for 
post-war investment, provide a means for wartime actors to obtain political power after 
the war (Addison 2001) and provide incentives for entrepreneurs to undermine 
government institutions (Nafzinger 2006: 16). 
 
Seen in this way ‘entrepreneurship’ is not necessarily intrinsically good or bad, but 
depends for its effects on the structure of incentives that a particular time and society 
offers. These structures and incentives can result in either a ‘rent economy’ or a 
‘productive economy’ (Stiglitz 2006: 7). In a rent economy the distribution of resources 
is often a zero-sum game which leads to conflict. According to Stiglitz (2006: 7) it is 
precisely because Africa has so many of its countries as rent economies (being 
dependent on natural resource exports) that conflicts are so frequent.6 Given this 
understanding of entrepreneurship, the policy implication is that efforts to increase the 
supply of entrepreneurship itself may be less important than efforts to change the 
allocation of entrepreneurial effort into productive entrepreneurship (Baumol 1990: 
                                                 
5    These business interests and business systems includes entrepreneurial activities oriented towards 
illegal mining and smuggling (e.g. conflict diamonds), preferential rationing systems, theft of 
humanitarian supplies, banditry and predation on civilians.  
6   Gallagher (1991) found that rents generated by import licenses in African countries ranges between 6 
per cent and 37 per cent of GDP.   5
895). In this paper some guidelines for domestic and international efforts to achieve 
such a shift is explored—see specifically Section 4. 
 
Productive entrepreneurship itself need to be distinguished from non-productive 
entrepreneurship, such as rent-seeking, but also from forms of entrepreneurship that are 
not unproductive in Baumol’s sense but which contribute little to economic growth. Into 
this category fall many informal firms, firms aimed at maintaining lifestyles, as well as 
survivalist firms which have been created out of necessity. The Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor (GEM) distinguishes necessity entrepreneurship from opportunity 
entrepreneurship. Not all types of opportunity entrepreneurship contribute significantly 
to economic growth. This has led the GEM to coin the term ‘high-potential growth 
entrepreneurship’,7 which corresponds with the notion of technologically innovative, 
pro-growth entrepreneurship that should be advanced by governments and development 
agencies—primarily in developed countries. The GEM does not include in its sample of 
37 countries any fragile state and include only two developing countries from Africa—
South Africa and Uganda. The GEM’s limited sample does however reflect that in 
developing countries (such as Peru, Uganda, South Africa, and India) necessity 
entrepreneurship rates tend to be higher, and a high preponderance of small and even 
micro-enterprises is found (Banerjee and Duflo 2007). This suggests that the connection 
between small (including micro) businesses and entrepreneurship needs to be 
understood. 
2.2  Entrepreneurship and small business 
Many policymakers see small business promotion as synonymous with entrepreneurial 
support. Although small firms no doubt can be entrepreneurial, and may have crucial 
advantages in the modern global economy (Audretsch and Thurik 2004), they are not 
necessarily, synonymous with entrepreneurship or entrepreneurial ventures (Wennekers 
and Thurik 1999: 29). Indeed, most of the small businesses that dominate in fragile 
states, especially in Africa, have been described as survivalist firms, characterized by 
necessity and lifestyle entrepreneurship rather that opportunity and growth-oriented 
entrepreneurship. Many small businesses in developed countries share some of these 
features, and a sizable proportion of small firms have been described as being 
dominated by managerial business owners rather than entrepreneurs (Carree et al. 2002: 
271). Small firms may be more risk-averse and less inclined to innovate and experiment 
than larger firms, given that risk is borne by a smaller number of individuals in such 
firms (McCann 2006: 654). For these reasons, many have expressed pessimism over the 
much discussed small business promotion programmes of many governments, donors 
and NGOs. Schramm (2004: 105) for instance describes most of these small business 
support programmes as poverty and livelihood oriented, tending to ‘involve cottage 
industries that add little to the economy in terms of productivity or growth’. Empirical 
evidence that small business development per se is good for growth is lacking. Beck 
et al. (2003) find no evidence that small business firm growth is associated with higher 
                                                 
7   The measurement of entrepreneurship is a contentious issue. Generally, measured in a static 
framework it refers to the rate of business ownership and in a dynamic framework to the rate of start-
ups. According to GEM certain start-ups can be seen as high-potential growth entrepreneurial 
ventures, namely those that (a) plan to employ no fewer than 20 employees within five years; (b) have 
indicated at least some impact on market creation; (c) have at least 25 per cent of their customers live 
abroad and (d) use technologies that have not been available for more than a year (Wong et al. 2005: 
345).    6
growth levels, and Parker (2006: 453) reports that there is no unambiguous empirical 
relationship between the rate of self-employment (often taken as a measure of 
entrepreneurship) and unemployment rates. Audretsch and Thurik (2004: 1) point out 
that many small business support programmes are in fact undertaken for social and 
political reasons rather than for economic motivations.  
 
The question that arises is: why do we see so many small and even micro-firms in the 
least developed countries? The answer is that there might be certain features of the 
environment which constrains the emergence of medium-sized and larger firms, rather 
than factors that make small firms more or less desirable. 
 
Small firm size may be a symptom of economy-wide uncertainty, imperfect information 
and high transaction costs—conditions which will make transactions within the 
boundary of the firm less efficient than market transactions. These conditions 
characterize many fragile states and post-conflict societies. One example is that the 
liquidity constraints that a firm face is a negatively associated with firm size (Audretsch 
et al. 2006: 147). It may also be a symptom of personal management/family ownership 
of firms which without the right environment (as for instance in Japan) could reduce 
growth. This is because in many such firms the objective is for a firm to maintain the 
entrepreneur’s lifestyle, be it survivalist or merely to ensure sufficient cash flow (Teece 
1993: 208). Small firms may also be a symptom of the fact that firms cannot exploit 
economies of scale of scope—not only due to liquidity constraints but because of a lack 
of transport infrastructure and transport services (Tirole 1988; Acs 2006; Banerjee and 
Duflo 2007). In many fragile countries these are seen as being due to the limited size of 
local markets. However, following Chandler (1990) it may also be due to limited 
managerial and organizational abilities. Indeed, firm size in Africa has been found to be 
positively related to the education- and skill-level of the entrepreneur (Ndulu et al. 
2007: 68). The preponderance of small firms in Africa and other fragile states may be 
due to path-dependence and the fact that other countries exploited a first-mover 
advantage in the exploitation of technologies that provided for large-scale production 
(Chandler 1990).  
 
Certainly much of the pessimism that small and micro-enterprises will drive growth in 
developing countries is not misplaced. However, a fair amount also arises due to the 
perceived disadvantages of small firms seen against the huge impact of large firms from 
the developed world on economic growth in developing countries during the twentieth 
century (see for e.g. Chandler 1990). Audretsch and Thurik (2001, 2004) argue that the 
global economy has changed in the meantime, and that during the era when size was 
important competitive advantages were due to capital and unskilled labour. In contrast, 
they argue that in the modern economy the critical production factor is knowledge—
which is generated through innovation, often faster in smaller, more flexible firms. 
Brock and Evans (1989) also note the increased importance of innovation as a source of 
growth in the modern economy as a reason why smallness may not be a disadvantage 
anymore, and also notes a number of other structural changes in many countries which 
are calling for the flexibility of smaller firms such as technological change which reduce 
the need for economies of scale, changes in labour force demographics which require 
greater employment flexibility, and changes in consumer tastes.  
 
The fact that most firms in fragile states and post-conflict societies are small firms is 
therefore not problematic or a cause for concern. Indeed, as argued by a number of   7
authors these firms may have the flexibility to utilize opportunities that larger firms, 
including state-owned enterprises and multinational firms, cannot. Smallness of firms 
reflects the under-developed state of an economy, where lack of formal sector 
employment lowers the opportunity costs of entrepreneurship (self-employment) (Acs 
2006). As the economy develops, relatively more people will shift into labour 
employment, so that the entrepreneurship rate (as measured by self-employment) will 
fall. As a result average firm size will increase, given further impetus by improvements 
in transport infrastructure. After a certain level of development, which brings with it 
technological advances and a proportionately larger service industry, self-employment 
and smaller firms will again start to increase. This results in a U-shaped relationship 
between rates of entrepreneurship and development (Acs 2006). 
 
Although the small size of firms is not per se a disadvantage—and may even be an 
advantage in the right circumstances—it may in fact not be in existing firms that the 
future growth of fragile states and post-conflict states lie but in the creation of new 
firms, i.e. start-ups. Research suggests that start-up firms are the ones most likely to 
grow (Lingelbach et al. 2005; Johnson et al. 2000) and to create new jobs (Audretsch 
et al. 2006: 25; McMillan and Woodruff 2002: 166). In many transition countries with 
no significant private sector to start with, new firms often strengthened reforms by 
improving economic conditions, as for instance in China (McMillan and Woodruff 
2002: 153). New firms can be important in a transition context in a post-conflict society 
since they are less encumbered with the historic influences of such a society as opposed 
to existing firms which may themselves be undergoing reform, and that some form of 
private sector development could be a condition for successful privatization of 
inefficient state-owned firms (Estrin et al. 2006: 693).  
 
Thus, focusing on start-ups that can result in pro-growth, entrepreneurial ventures 
should be an important objective when promoting entrepreneurship in fragile and post-
conflict states. In the next section, I discuss the ways in which such type of 
entrepreneurship can contribute towards peace and prosperity and ask how likely a 
resurgence in pro-growth entrepreneurship is in post-conflict states. 
3  How can entrepreneurship contribute towards peace and prosperity? 
Not all kinds of entrepreneurial activities necessarily promote growth, and not all kinds 
should be expected to contribute towards peace and prosperity. Apart from destructive 
and unproductive entrepreneurship, there may however be an important role for 
productive (both necessity and opportunity driven entrepreneurship) as well as high-
growth potential entrepreneurship. What are the contributions that such 
entrepreneurship can make towards development and peace in a post-conflict 
environment? 
 
Consider first high-growth potential entrepreneurship. When allocated to what have 
been termed pro-growth entrepreneurial ventures, entrepreneurship can contribute 
towards peace, security, and transition in fragile and conflict states through a number of 
ways. The first is through the contribution to economic growth and development. 
Entrepreneurs are essential in the reallocation of resources from low productivity uses 
towards higher productivity uses (Estrin et al. 2006: 693). As noted by Collier (2006: 9) 
development is the best strategy for peace. Entrepreneurs create jobs, provide diversity, 
assume risk, provide goods and services, including even public goods, as well as   8
provide an environment for learning, experimentation, innovation and competition 
(Sternberg and Wennekers 2005). Moreover, entrepreneurs fulfil a ‘cost discovery’ 
function (Hausmann and Rodrik 2003) in making sunk costs in a new activity which ex 
ante may or may not be profitable, but which will provide information ex post on such 
profitability to other entrepreneurs. In doing so, entrepreneurs provide information on 
what an economy can be good at producing, which in the context of fragile and post-
conflict states is information that may be fundamentally lacking. Furthermore, 
entrepreneurs generate change from inside the country and its economic system, rather 
than from the outside (Metcalfe 2006: 60). Entrepreneurship, through new business 
creation, can also be important for conflict reduction by providing vehicles for 
individual social mobility (Keister 2000). 
 
There are many potential opportunities for entrepreneurs in post-conflict and fragile 
states, such as the restructuring of the business sector by filling in niches, the provision 
of infrastructure,8 the addressing of supply-demand imbalance, e.g. due to pent-up 
demand, financial sector development and the possible return of flight capital and new 
foreign investment. Where state capacity may be weak or unwilling, post-conflict 
reconstruction could be facilitated by private sector support to governments. An 
example is that of South Africa’s transition where the private sector co-ordinated efforts 
to support the first post-apartheid government. One such initiative was the National 
Business Initiative (NBI) which brought together more than 150 private firms to provide 
public goods such as education, health, crime prevention and strengthening of local 
government capacity. 
 
Though networks, entrepreneurs can provide the functions of missing formal 
institutions, such as contract enforcement and credit (McMillan and Woodruff 2002: 
143; Estrin et al. 2006: 716), and even public goods such as roads, water, energy, and 
education (Uzor 2004).  
 
An important contribution could be through making these economies more diversified. 
Diversification is important for peace and growth (Collier 2006: 12; Iyigun and Rodrik 
2004). Diversity could result in less risk overall, and greater opportunities for 
knowledge externalities (Nelson 1991: 72). The latter could benefit from population 
heterogeneity that characterize many fragile states. Audretsch and Thurik (2004: 9) are 
of the opinion that ‘new ideas are more likely to emerge from communication in a 
heterogeneous than a homogenous world’. In this regard, the heterogeneity in many 
fragile states, which is often seen as a potential disadvantage, can indeed be a source of 
entrepreneurial innovation and growth. 
 
Another contribution of productive entrepreneurship is that it could provide a source for 
what has been termed ‘radical innovation’ as against ‘incremental innovation’ to use the 
terms of Teece et al. (1994). Incremental innovations are based on existing competences 
                                                 
8   In sub-Saharan Africa alone, more than US$18 billion per annum in infrastructure spending is needed 
to raise economic growth to a high enough rate (7 per cent) to achieve the MDGs by 2014 (Ndulu 
et al. 2007: 143). The rates of return on infrastructure projects have been found to be high in Africa—
on average 35 per cent between 1999 and 2003 (Briceno et al. 2004). Although public funding is 
required, opportunities for entrepreneurial firms in the construction and related industries are thus 
likely to be significant in post-conflict fragile states. Furthermore, infrastructural investment will 
benefit entrepreneurship through creation of off-farm employment in rural areas, and improving 
linkages between urban and rural areas, which will boost retail trade.    9
of existing firms and are more in the form of the diffusion of knowledge. The latter is 
important for fragile states as a catch up mechanism and is most often obtained from 
FDI and trade—which is often the motivation for trade liberalization in these countries, 
and for policies that attract FDI. Keller (2004: 752) points out that for most countries, 
foreign sources of technology account for 90 per cent or more of local productivity 
growth. Imitation and incremental innovation remain important. However, what is 
ultimately needed in fragile states, particularly those in Africa, is radical innovation. 
Such entrepreneurship which is ‘innately destructive of the status quo’ (Fogel et al. 
2006: 541) can serve precisely to undermine vested interests and even ‘crowd out’ rents 
by providing new and substitute opportunities (Baland and Francois 2000: 528). This is 
however also an important reason why new entrepreneurial ventures are often repressed 
in fragile states. 
 
Although high-potential, pro-growth entrepreneurship has been stressed in this section, 
careful policy attention should still be given to forms of entrepreneurship that has less of 
a growth impact, but can still be productive. Many informal, lifestyle and survivalist 
entrepreneurs resort in this category. Although they do not make a significant impact on 
economic growth, it has been pointed out that this sector is often targeted for social and 
anti-poverty reasons. A significant number of entrepreneurs are active in these forms of 
businesses in developing and fragile states. For instance in Peru about 69 per cent of 
poor households in urban areas own a business, and in India, Pakistan, and Nicaragua 
between 47 per cent and 52 per cent of households own a business (Banerjee and Duflo 
2007: 151). In rural areas, survey data from 13 poor countries reflects that between 
25 and 98 per cent of rural households are self-employed in some form of agricultural 
activity (Banerjee and Duflo 2007: 151). Thus, where economies are failing, 
entrepreneurship is often a source of survival as well as autonomy where states are 
underperforming—a fact that is sometimes under-appreciated when governments harass 
informal traders or tolerate practices that discriminates against women, who often make 
up a disproportionate number of these survivalist entrepreneurs. 
 
The policy objectives of governments, donors, NGOs and development agencies 
towards entrepreneurship in fragile states should be to recognize the importance of 
survivalist small entrepreneurs. Supporting these entrepreneurs can have a positive 
impact on poverty, or at least prevent poverty from progressively getting worse in 
certain circumstances (Sandy 2004). However, as Banerjee and Duflo (2007: 162) have 
pointed out ‘it is important not to romanticize these penniless entrepreneurs’. Indeed as 
economic prospects and opportunities deteriorate, and unemployment in the formal 
economy increases, this sector tends to expand. If policies to create the incentives for 
more high-growth impact ventures are successful, one should expect to see this 
survivalist sector shrink,9 and not expand, following the U-shape relationship between 
development and self-employment rates (Acs 2006). 
 
Given the potential of the right kind of entrepreneurship to contribute to development in 
post-conflict states, the question that could be asked is: how likely is entrepreneurship to 
be resurgent in these countries, conditional on the fact that the right structures and 
incentives can be put in place, and that the risk of falling back into conflict can be 
                                                 
9   One should therefore not see a rise in self-employment in developing countries necessarily as positive 
improvement in entrepreneurship.    10
minimized?10 The answer is that the prognosis is good. Of about 214 stagnation 
episodes in 146 countries, sustained growth followed in 54 per cent of cases (Aizenman 
and Spiegel 2007).11 More particularly, for countries ending war, subsequent growth is 
often high. The average rate of growth in a cross-country sample of post-conflict states 
for the five years following was 5.9 per cent (Przeworski et al. 2000). In many transition 
economies in East Europe, the former Soviet Union, and even China, the resurgence of 
the private sector has been underestimated (McMillan and Woodruff 2002: 153). Estrin 
et al. (2006: 694-95) documents the resurgence of the private sector in the EE-FSU, 
noting that the private sector share of GDP in increased in most countries from around 0 
per cent in 1989 to over 65 per cent by 2001. In China, one of the fastest growing 
countries in the world, the growth in entrepreneurship, as measured by self-
employment, was explosive, not only in the richer coastal provinces but also in the rural 
areas where the number of self-employed increased by more than 30 million during 
1988-95 (Mohapatra et al. 2007: 163). In Africa, there are many promising signs 
indicating that the private sector response to better incentives could be substantial. For 
example, in the mobile phone sector, where government regulation has been limited and 
private entrepreneurs the major initiators, the number of mobile phone users have 
increased from about 2 million in 1998 to over 100 million by 2006 (Ndulu et al. 2007: 
154). This has important implications for future African growth, given that 
communication technology is an important determinant of imitative entrepreneurship 
(Schmitz 1989: 722).12  
 
The likelihood of resurgent private sectors in these countries is further raised by the 
diverse (even by developed country comparisons) breeding grounds for entrepreneurs in 
many post-conflict countries. For instance, the circumstances and challenges that 
various communities and groups have faced during war, conflict, instability can be 
argued to have honed many entrepreneurial talents, and entrepreneurs can fruitfully 
emerge from a number of sectors, including households (in particular female-headed 
households), former state-run enterprises, traders (including smugglers, migrant 
entrepreneurs), immigrants, minority entrepreneurs, the emigrant community, young 
cadres/demobilized soldiers, university staff, as well as existing firms. Each of these 
groups has their own unique features, which together provides a rich tapestry of 
entrepreneurial talents which could be harnessed for post-conflict reconstruction and 
development. 
 
In light of the contribution that productive entrepreneurship can make to peace and 
prosperity, and that the resurgence of the private sector can indeed be rapid under the 
right circumstances given the scope and sources of entrepreneurship, the question can 
be raised how to create the right circumstances for productive, pro-growth 
entrepreneurship? In the next section, I argue that a minimum of six dimensions need to 
be taken into account when designing entrepreneurial support strategies in post-conflict 
states. 
 
                                                 
10  The risk of falling back into conflict is a significant risk facing the development of entrepreneurship in 
post-conflict societies. In Section 4.1 below this risk is discussed in more depth. 
11  To underscore the point about new firm creation as a means to diversify economies, recent research 
finds that sustained growth after years of stagnation is more likely the more diversified an economy is 
(Aizenman and Spiegel 2007). 
12  Schmitz (1989) shows that imitation by entrepreneurs account for a significant amount of growth.    11
4 Promoting  pro-growth  entrepreneurship 
As pointed out in the introduction, entrepreneurship in fragile states, and in particular 
states emerging from conflict, is an under-researched topic. The lack of data on 
entrepreneurship in these countries is therefore a constraint on policy design.13 This 
does not mean that policymakers are without direction in terms of understanding and 
responding to the need to foster productive, pro-growth entrepreneurship in these 
countries. There is fortunately a rich literature on the conditions facing poor households 
and firms in fragile states and post-conflict situations, as well as a valuable literature on 
private sector development from the literature on the transition economies of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union (EE-FSU) (e.g. Smallbone and Welter 2001; 
McMillan and Woodruff 2002). It is also useful to examine the extensive literature on 
Africa’s economic growth performance (see e.g. Fosu and O’Connell 2006; Ndulu et al. 
2007)14 through the lens of the literature on small business development and 
entrepreneurship. Within the latter there has been in recent years a significant growth in 
the literature on African firms (e.g. Bigsten and Söderbom 2005) which is, however, 
distinct from the literature that deals explicitly with African entrepreneurs. Indeed the 
literature on African entrepreneurs is unfortunately relatively small (see Naudé and 
Havenga 2007 for an overview of African entrepreneurship research) and mostly 
focuses on constraints facing informal entrepreneurs or their attributes.15 However, 
from the various strands of literature noted there are important potential lessons for 
supporting entrepreneurial ventures, as well as useful suggestions for a future research 
agenda. In this section I draw out some of these lessons, and also identify avenues for 
further research. 
4.1  Poverty, conflict, and entrepreneurship 
A prerequisite for understanding how to support pro-growth entrepreneurship in fragile 
and post-conflict states is to understand the context of war, conflict, and poverty which 
characterizes these states, and how these determine the supply and allocation of 
entrepreneurial talent. A number of factors distinguish such states from others. The most 
important is probably the context and consequences of civil war/conflict. The economic 
consequences of war and civil conflict have been studied in detail, and most recent 
estimates suggest that the impacts of civil war, especially the indirect impacts, are 
substantial and tend to last long (Chen et al. 2007). This includes the direct costs in 
terms of destruction of infrastructure, diverted (military) expenditure as well as the 
much higher indirect costs of disruption of markets and increase in risk and uncertainty. 
Milanovic (2005) provides estimates that show that the poorest countries have lost 
almost 40 per cent of their GDP compared to the global average, and Collier (1999) 
finds that civil conflict depresses growth rates by about 2.2 per cent per annum on 
average. Lopez and Wodon (2005) calculate that Rwanda’s GDP could have been 25 
per cent higher in 2001 if it had avoided the genocide of 1994. Civil conflict also has 
spillover effects reducing growth in neighbouring countries (Murdoch and Sandler 
                                                 
13  It would be useful to have a longitudinal study of entrepreneurship in fragile states, similar in purpose 
to the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) in the USA (see Gartner et al. 2004).  
14    It is particularly important to focus on African countries in this current context, given the large 
number of conflicts on the continent. Cooper (2006: 22) state that 40 per cent of all current armed 
conflicts in world is taking place in Africa. 
15  See, for instance, the collection published as Volume 9 of the African Perspectives Yearbook.   12
2002), and has a negative impact precisely on those groups from which entrepreneurs 
typically emerge, namely young males, through raising their mortality and lowering 
their educational achievements.  
 
In a post-conflict environment, the ‘overhang’ effects from the war create a number of 
possible threats to the emergence of productive, pro-growth entrepreneurship. The first 
is the possibility of a relapse into conflict, which is high—there is a 50 per cent risk of 
conflict renewal during the first five post-conflict years (Collier 2006: 19). 
 
Second, war and conflict cements the stratification between various ethnic groups and 
communities which requires significant post-conflict reconstruction, and fair allocation 
of budgetary resources to various group, to sufficiently improve social capital (Addison 
2001: 3).  
 
Third, opportunities for rent-seeking are likely to abound. In post-conflict societies, 
whilst some of the original incentives for rent-seeking might seem to have been 
lessened, other opportunities often arise through the fact that aid and foreign investment 
levels often rise quite substantially, and the reconstruction of infrastructure and the 
creation of trade and tourism opportunities are often the target of entrepreneurs seeking 
preferential access to these. Aguilar (2004: 87) describes how preferential business 
licensing has resulted in the formation of powerful oligopolies in Angola, which have 
subsequently formed strong lobbies in favour of protectionism and the general stifling 
of reform. A related danger is that privatization—in itself potentially important to 
stimulate private sector development—may be hijacked as has happened in Angola, 
Mozambique, and in some of the EE-FSU countries (Addison 2001: 8).16  
 
Fourth, possibilities for regulatory capture can encourage inappropriate forms of 
entrepreneurship. Many wartime entrepreneurs obtain substantial resources during (and 
because of) war and civil conflict. Post-conflict this poses the danger that, as has 
happened in the former Soviet Union, that entrepreneurs can finance post-conflict 
political parties and create a ‘compliant private media’ (Addison 2001: 13). In many 
African countries, the blurring of borders between the state and the party has also 
caused regulatory capture in many instances, with party officials’ business interest being 
advanced through their links with, and hold over, government officials (Aguilar 2004: 
79). 
 
Fifth, rent-seeking and regulatory capture, together with the differential impact of the 
war on various communities, will exacerbate income inequalities, which is in itself often 
a cause for further conflict, particularly in a socially stratified society. The higher the 
likelihood of a relapse, the stronger will be the incentive for entrepreneurs to engage in 
short-term behaviour that might be unproductive or destructive such as shifting assets. 
Evidence seems to suggest that the shorter the period of preceding conflict, the more 
likely such shifting of assets may be, unless entrepreneurs have high confidence in the 
credibility of various parties’ commitment to peace (Collier 1999: 168).  
 
Six, the war overhang can have negative effects on pro-growth entrepreneurship through 
continued high spending on the military (Collier 2006). Conflict necessitated high 
                                                 
16   Lack of adequately defined property rights and transparency in privatization in the former Soviet 
Union lead to large amounts of assets being appropriated by entrepreneurs (Addison 2001).   13
military expenditure which created vested interests. This makes a reduction in military 
spending after the war difficult—and thus reduces the ‘peace dividend’ as well as 
creates pressures for fiscal deficit spending. The latter in turn gives rise to a high tax 
liability environment. As a result of shrinking tax bases as tax rates rises (e.g. through 
capital flight and a resort to ‘informal’ or parallel markets) governments typically resort 
to heavy taxes on international trade (Azam 2007). This creates strong incentives for 
smuggling, bribery, corruption, which are documented in virtually every case where 
trade taxes have become seriously distortive. High trade taxes and unsustainable fiscal 
deficit spending inevitably results in a high inflation environment, which contributes 
significantly to capital flight from post-conflict states (Davies 2007).   
 
From the aforementioned discussion it is clear that war and conflict itself, being driven 
by ‘conflict entrepreneurs’, discourages the supply and allocation of entrepreneurship to 
productive, pro-growth activities. The signing of peace agreements unfortunately does 
not signal the automatic resurgence of pro-growth entrepreneurship; various 
characteristics of the conflict environment may create an overhang which, unless 
addressed, will maintain and create incentives for unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship to continue.  
 
Therefore, post-conflict reconstruction should aim to raise the costs of conflict and 
make the benefits of co-operation as large as possible, as a general approach towards 
preventing a return to violence (Stiglitz 2006). Ways of doing this include the 
strengthening of networks (when likelihood of repeated future interaction is high the 
benefits of co-operation rises), breaking down of stratification (hence the necessity of 
‘truth and reconciliation’ initiatives, nation building and governments of national unity) 
and strengthening social capital (reuniting communities, providing information, 
education, and peaceful outlets for political differences). It also includes political 
patronage. The latter may be the most frequently used approach in human history to 
limit violence. North et al. (2006) describes this in a historical context as a ‘limited 
access order’, which entails the placing of limits of access to economic and political 
opportunities by powerful individuals and groups in order to create rents, which are 
used to placate potential sources of conflict. Although the relative peace that this 
ensures is beneficial, and may leave substantial scope for productive entrepreneurship 
depending on the precise forms which limits to access takes, North et al. (2006: 72) sees 
the scope for economic development in such a limited access order as fundamentally 
limited, as against institutional arrangements which results in an ‘open access order’. 
The latter is most conducive to high-growth entrepreneurship, but is in the words of 
North et al. (2006: 72) ‘very difficult to engineer’. This may suggest that the 
imperatives and shorter terms benefits of establishing peace in many conflict-ridden 
fragile states will tend to result in different types of limited access orders which may 
very be not conducive for productive, pro-growth entrepreneurship. Wolff (2007) 
recently postulated that Russia’s transition has ended up with its elites using the 
political system in such as way as to create rents which are then used to stabilize the 
political system. The consequence is an absence of civil war and conflict, but also a 
relative absence of pro-growth entrepreneurship. 
 
Changes in the incentives of the structure of society that raise the costs of conflict and 
the benefits of co-operation are indeed very difficult to achieve, and requires an 
understanding of the institutional dynamics of policy reform and its relation to 
entrepreneurship.   14
4.2  Institutional reform and entrepreneurship  
Frye and Shleifer (1997) classify governments as either providing an ‘invisible hand’, a 
‘helping hand’, or a ‘grabbing hand’ as far as the private sector development is 
concerned. For fragile and post-conflict states the fundamental long-term challenge is to 
change governments from being invisible or grabbing hands towards being helping 
hands. Collier (2007) mentions in this regard that development requires opportunities 
and the ability to seize these—with governments preventing the seizure of opportunities. 
The latter happens through various deliberate and unintended barriers, including high 
costs of forming a business. A precondition for pro-growth entrepreneurship in post-
conflict societies is therefore that governance and transactional trust be restored. This 
will entail, inter alia, the establishment of rules, regulations, property rights, contract 
enforcement, limiting the role of the state as an economic player, and lowering the costs 
of business formation (Fogel et al. 2006: 541), in other words, the creation of ‘good 
institutions’ (Estrin et al. 2006: 693). The stability and credibility of these reforms are 
important, and it is accepted that policy reform requires mechanisms to ‘lock in’ the 
reform, which in effect make reversals of reform measures more costly (Collier and 
Pattillo 2000). 
 
As far as the design of good institutions post-conflict states are concerned, we are still 
largely in uncharted waters. A number of factors complicate institutional design, 
suggesting that although there may be certain core universal requirements, a one-size-
fits-all approach to institutional design may be inappropriate. For one, institutions are 
endogenous (Acemoglu et al. 2005) and relatively little is known about the co-evolution 
of institutions, entrepreneurial behaviour and a country’s stages of development (Fogel 
et al. 2006: 572).  
 
Second, ‘obvious’ policy reforms to create good institutions such as mentioned above 
(e.g. property rights, rule of law, etc.) may only be a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for development. Iyigun and Rodrik (2004) note that many countries where 
much progress have been made in adopting these during the 1990s experienced low and 
disappointing growth, whereas countries with less enthusiasm for the received wisdom 
(e.g., China and Vietnam) achieved higher growth rates.  
 
Third, institutional reform itself is an ongoing, dynamic process that needs to be 
managed with care towards its speed and consistency (Estrin et al. 2006). It creates 
uncertainties which can have unwanted outcomes for productive entrepreneurship to 
emerge, such as the entrenchment of former elites and a rise in rent-seeking behaviour 
(see Section 4.1).   
 
Fourth, initial conditions may matter for the dynamics and success of institutional 
strengthening. These include the distribution of income and wealth before the 
commencement of institutional reforms and institutional building. High wealth 
inequalities may be associated with lower start-up rates. It also has to be recognized that 
during civil war, different households will have different means and opportunities to 
maintain or dispose of assets so that their post-conflict ability to start-up businesses will 
differ across the country and between various groups (Addison 2001; Brück 2006). 
Household structure, which in itself may be influenced by the war, will influence the 
subsequent start-up rate not only through the assets that may allocate towards new 
ventures, but also in its attitudes and experiences towards risk-taking, and existing   15
commitments (Brush and Manolova 2004: 39). Hence also the call for decentralization 
(see Section 4.6) of entrepreneurial support programmes. This suggests the importance 
of targeting various groups (also, in particular, women) and places in a country so as to 
have the best effect on start-ups. It also suggests that the borders between firms and 
households in fragile states are often blurred and that understanding households better 
may improve understanding of entrepreneurship in these situations. 
 
Fifth, the wide variety of opportunities being exploited during a war, including 
survivalist behaviour and actions to profit from war are often criminalized in the post-
conflict era before alternative profit opportunities are established. This is important to 
recognize in countries such as Afghanistan where it is estimated that up to 80 per cent of 
the economy is involved in drug trade and Angola where only 10 per cent of GNP is 
produced in the formal economy (Cooper 2006).  
 
Six, one should recognize that post-conflict transition can go through various stages, as 
it did in the EE-FSU. Estrin et al. (2006: 697) document three phases, each with its own 
implications and opportunities for entrepreneurship. In the first phase they note that 
uncertainty will be high, but that many opportunities for arbitrage will exist. Policy 
should aim to reduce uncertainty (e.g. through macroeconomic and political stability) 
and encourage entrepreneurs to be active as traders and middlemen. In the second 
phase, longer-term investment will start to take place, as lower uncertainty and 
government stability give rise to public sector investment projects and the latter start to 
crowd in private sector investment. The efficient implementation of public sector 
investment projects and the attraction of external resources for investment (aid and FDI) 
are important policy objectives in this phase. The third phase is characterized by the 
deepening of institutions to promote finance, market exchange, and contract 
enforcement. Entrepreneurs in this phase will engage in raising levels of competition 
and the growing maturity of networks and national innovation systems will encourage 
technological transfers and innovation. Policy objectives during this phase should 
include the promotion of R&D,17 university-based research, networking and clustering. 
4.3  Displaced communities, minorities, and entrepreneurs  
War and conflict displaces communities and entrepreneurs. It also marginalizes and 
represses immigrants and minorities. Good entrepreneurs in particular are highly 
mobile. Conflict displaces entrepreneurs, weakening their social networks and family 
bonds (Addison 2001: 2). For example, during Mozambique’s 18-year civil war it is 
estimated that more than 5 million people have been displaced internally and almost 
2  million had emigrated (Ndulu et al. 2007). The 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrean war 
displaced more than 1.5 million Eritreans (Addison 2001: 2-3). More than a million 
Afghans are estimated to have fled to Iran. The total number of refugees in the world 
today exceeds 10 million (Loescher et al. 2007), and the number of émigrés not counted 
as refugees but leaving due to uncertainties, persecution and the like probably amount to 
a similar magnitude. Solimano (2002: 17-18) discusses the prominence of 
                                                 
17  Should developing countries spend many resources on R&D? The answer would seem to be that it is 
not as vital, especially during the first stages of institutional development. For one, imitation may have 
higher returns initially. Two, spending on R&D can crowd out entrepreneurship with the result that 
there might be new ideas but not enough entrepreneurs to implement these (Michelacci 2003: 256). 
Three, empirical evidence finds that entrepreneurship is distinct from innovation and will contribute 
more than knowledge capital to economic growth (Audretsch and Keilbach 2004: 949).    16
‘entrepreneurial migration’ in recent years and its potential impact on developing 
countries. Very often the people who emigrate tend to be relatively skilled individuals. 
Ndulu et al. (2007: 157) quotes the International Organization for Migration which 
estimates that here are more African scientists and engineers working in the USA than 
there are in Africa.  
 
Development of pro-growth entrepreneurship in post-conflict societies needs first of all 
to be able to limit the migration of skilled individuals, to mobilize the talent in their 
émigré population,18 use their diasporas as sources of entrepreneurial finance,19 to 
ensure policies for the recruitment of skilled labour and skilled entrepreneurs from 
elsewhere, and to improve conditions for immigrant and minority groups. These 
elements are most often neglected in entrepreneurship support during transition. A case 
in point is South Africa, where more than a million skilled individuals have left the 
country since 1994, precisely when the country entered its post-conflict transition phase. 
Two other elements that are also overlooked in theory and practice are that: 
(i)  A growing number of individuals appear ‘trapped’ in protracted refugee 
situations which mean that they can be refugees for an average of up to 17 years 
(Loescher et al. 2007: 1); as refugees they face many restrictions which limit 
their capacity to engage in productive, pro-growth activities.  
(ii)  Returning refugees, emigrants and demobilized soldiers often require access to 
land which, given the rural and agricultural basis of many start-ups ventures, 
can create substantial conflict, as in Angola, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau (Addison 
2001) and more recently Zimbabwe.  
 
In many countries where land reform and land distribution schemes are in place, intra-
group conflict due to inappropriate or missing management of the land reform and 
redistribution process may limit the economic performance of such nascent 
entrepreneurs, and may have a negative impact on the ability of the agricultural sector to 
recover after conflict. In Angola, the displacement of the rural population during war, 
the legacy of the war in the form of landmines that remain buried in prime agricultural 
land, as well as uncertainties and difficulties in terms of land reform, have been 
recognized to have had a depressing effect on the ability of entrepreneurs to take up the 
many opportunities that exists in the country’s agricultural sector (Aguilar 2004: 89).  
 
While war and conflict displace people in a dramatic and visible fashion, poverty and 
small markets often lead to different forms of migration, namely temporary or cyclical 
migration, for reasons of trade. In many cases this migration crosses borders and 
assumes an international dimension. Muzvidziwa (2004) documents the case of 
thousands of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs, most of them women, who trade across 
borders on a daily basis despite being prosecuted. In many countries, rural-urban 
migration assumes such a cyclical nature, and can be seen as a rural household income 
diversification strategy (Azam 2007). 
                                                 
18  Haque and Kahn (1997) argue that international agencies should use national emigrants in technical 
assistance operations.  
19  Emigrant populations have been recognized as sources of funding for rebel groups during civil war. 
Currently a sizable fraction of African-owned wealth is held outside the continent—up to 39 per cent 
according to estimates of Collier and Gunning (1999). The total registered remittances by emigrants to 
their countries of origin almost exceeded US$100 billion in 2004, an amount significantly larger that 
total aid to developing countries (Carling 2005).   17
Finally, in many fragile states and post-conflict environments it may be important to 
reconsider the roles of immigrant and/or ethnic (minority) entrepreneurs20 as these are 
often important sources of productive entrepreneurship. The networks, business 
environment and inherited wealth associated with these communities are seen to confer 
entrepreneurial advantages on members of these communities (Munshi 2007: 1; 
Richman 2006: 384). In many of the least developed economies ethnic entrepreneurs 
play a valuable role, see for instance the role of Asian entrepreneurs in Kenya, 
Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda; Lebanese entrepreneurs in Liberia 
and Angola; and Chinese entrepreneurs in Cape Verde (see e.g. Egbert 2004; Sandy 
2004; PRIO 2007).  
 
However, ethnic (including immigrant and minority entrepreneurs) are often harassed 
and persecuted in many fragile states, and often find refuge in entrepreneurship due to 
political restrictions or being denied employment in the formal sector (Godley 2006: 
608; Greene and Owen 2004: 27). During and after conflicts, these groups may face 
particularly difficult circumstances. This is especially true of minority entrepreneurs in 
Africa. Godley (2006: 605) for instance describes the expulsion of more than 155,000 
Asians from Uganda in 1972 stating that these contained a significant number of 
entrepreneurs who migrated to the UK where they ‘have had a disproportionate impact 
on entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial success’. In Angola, Lebanese entrepreneurs 
have been so successful that they have been seen as a threat to large state-patronized 
firms (Aguilar 2004: 88). The phenomenon of successful ethnic entrepreneurs is not 
limited to developing countries. In the USA start-up rates among blacks and Hispanics 
tend to be much higher than among whites (Gartner et al. 2004: 18). The Ewing Marion 
Kauffman Foundation (2007: 15-16) documents that high-skilled foreign-born 
entrepreneurs make a significant contribution to start-ups and innovation in the USA 
stating that 25 per cent of all venture capital backed firms in the country since 1990 
have been started by immigrants.  
4.4  Market size, access, and entrepreneurship  
The capacity of entrepreneurs to find markets and co-ordinate production, distribution 
and marketing may be more important that technology, which they see as being readily 
available in many instances (Chandler 1990; Teece 1993). Although it is certainly the 
case that technology is not that readily available21 in fragile states, it must be an 
important objective of entrepreneurial support in fragile states to improve the capacity 
of entrepreneurs to find markets, and have the means to market and distribute their 
products and services. First, following the destruction of infrastructure during war, 
investments in transport and trade infrastructure are vital (Naudé and Matthee 2007). 
Second, regional trade integration is important, especially to the large number of 
landlocked countries in Africa (Sachs et al. 2004). Third, efforts are required to get 
small firms to be able to export more, given the predominance of small firms in these 
countries. Currently, small firms export little and almost no internationalization of small 
firms and start-ups seems to take place in developing and fragile states, despite the clear 
                                                 
20    Waldinger et al. (1990: 3) define ethnic entrepreneurship as entrepreneurship based on ‘a set of 
connections and regular patterns of interaction among people sharing common national background or 
migration experiences’.  
21   Keller (2004: 753) points to the fact that no global pool of technology exists, and that technology 
tends to be localized. Moreover, the tacit nature of much of technology implies that technological 
diffusion to fragile and post-conflict states will not be an automatic process.    18
need to find markets. Unfortunately little is currently known in the research literature on 
international entrepreneurship in fragile states.22 For instance, in the recent Handbook 
of Research on International Entrepreneurship (Dana 2004) which has 40 chapters, 
there is not a single chapter on a fragile state or any of the least developed countries, 
such as those in Africa. Although it is difficult for small firms to export (see Söderstrom 
and Teal 2004; Naudé and Krugell 2004) it may be achieved, as shown by examples 
from a growing number of countries. A number of preconditions exist though over the 
short-to-medium term for greater exports as well as the eventual internationalization 
from entrepreneurial ventures in fragile states. One is the importance of networks and 
clusters (Dana and Wright 2004: 9; Schmitz 1995, 1999). There are different types of 
networks such as personal networks and organizational networks (Egbert 2004; Uzor 
2004). Amongst organizational networks linkages amongst small firms are important 
sources of externalities, and linkages between small and larger (often more well-
established firms) are important in realizing economies of scope, as when small firms 
can perform specialized functions for large firms (Altenburg and Meyer-Stamer 1999). 
Small firms can even become important for innovation through their linkages with 
larger firms, as in the USA where many large firms in effect outsource their R&D to 
start-ups (Schramm 2004: 109). Van Dijk (2004) describes the advantages provided by 
clustering of small firms in Burkina Faso, such as cost reductions, greater access to 
inputs, finance and training, and opportunities for co-entrepreneurship. 
 
Personal networks can act as substitutes for missing institutions in fragile states in a 
number of ways, such as making reputational incentives stronger where court 
enforcement is weak; in providing trade credit where bank credit is limited, and in 
allowing entrepreneurs opportunity for ‘portfolio’ entrepreneurship to spread risk 
(Estrin et al. 2006: 716). Networks can also facilitate learning to export, which can help 
entrepreneurs in fragile states overcome the high fixed cost in exporting (Söderbom and 
Teal 2004). Despite the clear importance of networks and clusters in the literature, they 
also have shortcomings and limitations, which will depend on the country context, the 
type of network and the underlying reason or its existence. Thus, in many cases 
networks can inhibit, rather than promote innovation (Munshi 2007: 2). This is often the 
case in family-owned firms and firms in ethnic clusters (Egbert 2004). Wohlmuth 
(2004: 225) notes that the exclusivity of many networks in Africa may limit their impact 
on pro-growth entrepreneurship. 
 
Finally, although the scope of markets for entrepreneurs in fragile states and those 
emerging from conflict needs to be enlarged, the perceived exports/trade from many 
such states have often been underestimated. Again, it is a case of entrepreneurs being 
inventive in finding markets and circumventing detection. One particular reflection of 
this is the low volumes of recorded trade between African countries, which according to 
Azam (2007: 1) is in all likelihood not the case due to smuggling and the informal 
economy, since ‘any fieldwork, either in warehouses or near the borders, would 
convince the observer that a lot of trade was going on’. It may be important to find 
novel ways of support, and not criminalizing, much of the existing productive (but 
unrecorded) activities of entrepreneurs. 
                                                 
22   The field of international entrepreneurship studies the field of why, when and how entrepreneurs 
internationalize their firm. The March 2001 edition of Small Business Economics is devoted to the 
internationalization of small business.    19
4.5  Human and financial capital and entrepreneurship   
There is little doubt, also in entrepreneurial support programmes in developed countries, 
that human capital development and access to financial capital are significant 
requirements for the growth and development of entrepreneurs. I first discuss some 
aspects of the support for human capital and then turn to financial capital. 
4.5.1 Human capital 
In a developing country context, it is frequently pointed out that it is management 
capabilities and management capacity that needs to be strengthened. Even the type of 
skills provided for entrepreneurship have been identified; entrepreneurs require multiple 
or balanced skills instead of specialization (Lazear 2004: 208). Management skills are 
particularly important in the present context for reasons of networking; efficient 
networking depends on appropriate organizational and management skills (Dana and 
Wright 2004: 9).  
 
Internal differences in firms’ management and organization in fragile and post-conflict 
states could therefore very well be an important source of the lack of growth and 
dynamism of these firms. There is however a relative lack of research on these 
‘industrial organization’ and management aspects of entrepreneurs in fragile states. 
Nelson (1991) noted that economists often see differences between firms as a result of 
different environment, and not due to discretionary differences. Many economists 
working on firms in developing countries (see for instance the work based on the World 
Bank’s Regional Enterprise Development Programme in Africa) take this position, and 
ascribe differences in firm behaviour in Africa (e.g. in terms of investment, exports, 
employment choices) as due to different market and business conditions. Thus, if these 
are changed according to prescription, then these firms are expected to behave more as 
other firms without the adverse market and business environment (e.g. Bigsten and 
Söderbom 2005).  
 
Although it is undoubtedly accurate to infer that the external environment does impact 
on firm behaviour and the actions of entrepreneurs, it may also be the case that firm 
differences are discretionary due to, for instance, entrepreneurial strategies and aims 
(i.e. due to internal aspects of African firms). As put by Nelson (1991: 69) ‘to be 
successful in a world that requires that firms innovate and change, a firm must have a 
coherent strategy that enables it to decide what new ventures to go into and what to stay 
out of. And it needs a structure, in the sense of mode of organization and governance 
that guides and supports the building and sustaining of the core capabilities needed to 
carry out that strategy effectively’. It may very be that traditional owner-managed firms 
and family/household firms in fragile states cannot implement new technologies or 
adopt strategies to broaden their markets because these are beyond their organizational 
capabilities. Changes in these organizational abilities of firms in fragile states may 
therefore be an important medium- to long-term strategy to raise growth.  
 
Further research is needed to identify the factors that might be stifling organization 
change in fragile states and in African countries in particular. One such factor may be 
the lack of adequate education and training offered to women entrepreneurs (who often 
predominate during and after conflict) and which is reflected in the fact that profits of 
female-headed micro-enterprises in African countries tend to be in some case less than   20
half those of men (Addison 2001: 4).23 Another such factor may be the lack of adequate 
‘national innovation systems’ to promote change, technological advancement, and 
institutional deepening (Lundvall 1992). Nelson (1991: 72) notes as important in this 
regard are open, free and ‘entrepreneurial’ universities, a culture for scientific discourse, 
appropriate public infrastructure, legal frameworks, and support for R&D.  
 
Related to the need for organizational changes and national innovation systems, is the 
fact that entrepreneurs need to perceive opportunities before they can exploit them. 
Once they have perceived opportunities, they need to create a firm as vehicle to utilize 
these opportunities (Alvarez et al. 2005: 6). The psychological (individual-level) aspect 
that influences this ability has not been adequately researched in the context of 
developing countries. Two issues in particular have however been noted. The first is the 
apparent lack interest by many poor people to seek opportunities. In a recent review of 
the behaviour of the extreme poor (those living with less than US$1 per day) Banerjee 
and Duflo (2007: 165) are perplexed by the apparent lack of the poor to perceive 
opportunities, stating ‘one senses a reluctance of poor people to commit themselves 
psychologically to a project of making more money’. This may, however, not only 
reflect a lack of psychological commitment, but also the fact that entrepreneurs have 
limited attention, and that in poor countries the environment is such that it attaches a 
very high opportunity cost for an individual to turn attention away from pressing 
matters in order to seek or perceive new opportunities (Gifford 1998: 17). It also 
prevents the absorption of difficult knowledge and therefore adversely impact on skills 
development support programmes (Lall 2000).This is often why manager-owners and 
family businesses have difficulty in innovating and adopting new technology, and why 
separation of management and ownership (entrepreneurship) may often be required for 
entrepreneurial ventures to emerge.  
 
A second aspect is that the obstacles to create a firm once an opportunity has been 
perceived sometimes arise out of complexities associated with an ever increasing 
number of forms of business ownership—many of these perhaps incompatible with 
traditional institutional frameworks which sees private ownership and private property 
rights as essential in firm formation. Sun (2003: 17) describes a variety of ownership 
structures that have emerged in recent years such as employee-owned firms, farmer-
owned co-operatives, and joint ownerships. He notes that the nature of the firm is 
changing and that ‘a diverse pattern of enterprise ownership and governance is 
emerging’. This cautions against being too prescriptive in defining or supporting the 
formats that entrepreneurial ventures can take, and in being too much focused on the 
individual as the unit of analysis in entrepreneurship research and policy support 
(Hwang and Powell 2005: 201).  
4.5.2 Financial  capital 
Lack of financial support is often cited as one of the foremost constraints facing 
entrepreneurs. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Banarjee and Newman (1993) 
illustrated how access to finance is important for start-ups, and that the accumulation of 
personal assets is often necessary to start a business. Many macroeconomic reform 
                                                 
23    Research on women entrepreneurs in post-conflict states (e.g. Ethiopia, Mozambique) show that 
despite their hugely important role in these societies in general, they tend to be either necessity 
entrepreneurs, or find it difficult to exploit opportunities due to being marginalized (Stevenson and 
St. Onge 2005: 11).   21
strategies in developing countries have attempted to support financial sector stability, 
and financial ‘deepening’. Similarly, the lack of proper financial institutions in the 
countries of EE-FSU has been recognized as a factor limiting the adjustment of these 
economies to market economies. As a consequence, much international effort has gone 
into the development of so-called micro-credit programmes in developing countries, 
with notable examples of such programmes to be found in Bangladesh (Grameen Bank), 
Bolivia (BancoSol) and Indonesia (Bank Rakyat). The usefulness of these programmes 
as a manner of alleviating poverty in some countries has been noted (Schreiner and 
Woller 2003: 1567) although the absence of noticeable examples from Africa stands 
out. In fact Pitamber (2004: 494) is highly critical of micro-finance institutions in Africa 
stating that evidence is lacking that these programmes have had a noticeable impact on 
poverty. The implied context sensitivity of micro-credit programmes have also been 
illustrated by Schreiner and Woller (2003) who finds that micro-credit and micro-
enterprise development programmes have been much more difficult in the USA that in 
developing countries.  
 
Just as programmes successful in a developing country context do not work in a 
developed country context, so care has to be taken in attempting to duplicate financial 
systems from developed countries onto the reality of fragile states. For one, most 
entrepreneurs make use of own funds (savings) in establishing a business. Or where 
external funding is used, informal sources are most often used, instead of formal banks. 
The development of the formal bank system is therefore unlikely in itself to reduce 
financial constraints on entrepreneurial start-ups in fragile states. Indeed, despite the 
substantial theoretical literature on the role of finance (e.g. Banarjee and Newman 1993) 
it remains the case that empirical evidence on finance as a constraint is at best mixed 
(Munshi 2007; Paulson et al. 2006).24 Furthermore, Lloyd-Ellis and Bernhardt (2000: 
160) point out that frequent complaints by entrepreneurs captured in surveys about lack 
of access to finance ‘often masks technical and managerial inadequacies’. In fact, some 
authors doubt whether financial constraints are that binding on start-ups, and see it to be 
more important in the expansion of existing businesses rather that in the creation of new 
firms (Estrin et al. 2006: 702). This has to been seen against the observation that start-
up requirements are often relatively small in developing countries (Lingelbach et al. 
2005: 5). Also, it is unlikely that banks will ever be major financiers of entrepreneurial 
ventures (start-ups) in high-technology and science based industries, preferring low-risk 
firms—preferably ones that have been existing for some time so as to have a reputation 
and/or collateral (Audretsch et al. 2006: 146). The development of funding for high-tech 
entrepreneurial start-ups in fragile states is therefore an important objective. Such 
funding should take into consideration the possibility that a motivator for many people 
in developing countries for starting their own business could be control aversion, i.e. to 
be independent (autonomous), and that forms of finance which could reduce their 
control over their enterprise (such as venture capital funds) may not be attractive (Petty 
and Bygrave 1993). 
 
The implication from this discussion is that a sufficient understanding of the role of 
finance in fragile states and post-conflict states is still lacking. Issues on which further 
research are needed, include the clarification of the relationship between entrepreneurial 
skills and finance, the capital requirements for start-ups in post-conflict and fragile 
                                                 
24   The debate about whether financial sector development causes economic growth or is a result of 
economic growth has also not been settled empirically (Calderon and Liu 2003: 322).   22
states, the context-specific forms of finance most appropriate in different situations and 
the need for funding of high-technology enterprises. 
4.6  Governments, entrepreneurs, and development of the private sector  
Having discussed how the context of war, the requirements of institutional reform shape 
the post-conflict environment for entrepreneurs in fragile and post-conflict states, and 
having pointed out the necessity of focusing on the displacement of people, their access 
to markets, education and finance is important, it remains to make a few remarks of the 
appropriate forms of government–private sector interaction that will be most conducive 
in this.  
 
Clearly, although entrepreneurs in fragile states often provide substitutes for 
government functions, and co-exist with states with an ‘invisible’ or even ‘grabbing 
hand’, over the long run government support for private sector development is vital. 
Moreover, as economic historians and scholars in the field of industrial organization 
will argue, a ‘developmental state’ is required for long-run development of private 
enterprise (Lazonick 2007).  
 
Private sector development (and more specific pro-growth entrepreneurship) in fragile 
states have been hindered not only through the adverse incentive structures which 
promoted unproductive and destructive forms of entrepreneurship, but also due to 
reductions in the capacity of governments to support private sector development 
(Wohlmuth 2004: 211) as well as strategies that were limited to macro-level issues 
instead of micro-level constraints. The latter have often entailed tied-aid as well as 
donor and international development agency support for privatization, liberalization and 
the reduction of the policy space of governments (Schulpen and Gibbon 2002: 1). 
 
Although one should be mindful of the difference between entrepreneurship 
(entrepreneurial ventures) and small businesses, the latter has a potentially significant 
role to play in post-conflict states, as was remarked in Section 2. This means that 
government attitudes and approaches towards small and micro-enterprises should be 
such as to facilitate the emergence of high-growth entrepreneurial ventures, as well as to 
allow small and micro firms to be vehicles of autonomy and security. In many fragile 
and post-conflict states small businesses have been neglected. As pointed out by 
Wohlmuth (2004: 5) this is particularly the case in Africa. He notes that agricultural 
development strategies were biased towards large-scale, mechanized cash-crop type of 
ventures, manufacturing development was premised on large state-owned firms and 
multinationals, and information and communication infrastructure were neglected. 
 
Not only should the appropriate vehicles for entrepreneurship development be the object 
of support, but it should be the right inputs required by entrepreneurial ventures that 
should be supported, rather than outputs. Governments and donors have in the past often 
targeted outputs (industries, state-owned firms, multinationals) for support rather than 
inputs such as knowledge and skills (Audretsch and Thurik 2004: 11). Because this can 
be difficult in a situation where government is itself constrained in terms of skills and 
knowledge, it is often more appropriate and effective over the short term to stimulate 
entrepreneurship through the elimination of barriers than to provide direct forms of 
intervention (see also Garret and Wall 2006: 525). The problem with this argument is 
the implicit assumption that entrepreneurship development will take place automatically 
once obstacles have been removed (Wohlmuth 2004: 4). Although the private sector is   23
resurgent in many cases as was noted in Section 3, support for inputs may be very 
necessary. With the availability of resources, support for inputs can take many forms. 
Schramm (2004) notes for instance the effective use of subsidies in the USA for R&D, 
small business innovation funds, government procurement from local high-tech firms, 
etc. Although spending on R&D subsidies is more appropriate during later stages of 
development (see Section 4.2), in resource-rich fragile states, where the extraction of 
resources have often been a ‘curse’ in that it resulted in conflict, rent-seeking, and 
adverse macroeconomic effects, strategies to beneficiate mineral resources may create 
opportunities for entrepreneurship—but dependent on government co-ordination of 
inputs such as technology and knowledge of markets. 
 
Whatever modalities of support for small business may be forthcoming, it may be 
important to provide these in a decentralized manner. A shortcoming of many 
programmes is that they tend to be centralized. This reflects a general trend in most 
fragile states, particularly in Africa, for governments to centralize decision making (the 
so-called capital city bias). Thus decentralization, local economic development and 
spatial development initiatives were neglected in Africa (as against for instance Asia, 
specifically China, where local planning and marketing have been a much more 
prominent strategy). There are a number of benefits from decentralization of decision-
making and small business support initiatives. The first is that entrepreneurs in small 
businesses in developing countries may be difficult to reach. This is because the number 
of small and micro firms is numerous, and they have few professional managers who 
may be members of national networks (Knott 2005: 393). Second, by promoting 
entrepreneurship from a national level, governments may miss supporting innovative 
activities which are very often localized (in regional clusters or networks) (see 
Audretsch and Thurik 2004: 12). Third, after conflict, infrastructural and other support 
for entrepreneurship is likely to have significant spatial differences. Brück (2006) 
emphasizes the importance of decentralization in the provision of public goods in post-
conflict countries, illustrating the wide regional differences in experience of the war in 
Mozambique. Finally, decentralization of responsibility for economic development to 
local government level could improve locality marketing initiatives, the identification of 
local opportunities for investment, and better ties between local business chambers and 
local government structures (Jansen van Rensburg and Naudé 2007). 
5  Summary and conclusions 
Although a number of countries are still engaged in conflict across the world, the total 
number of conflicts has been declining significantly since the early 1990s. As a 
consequence, a growing number of people in fragile states are enjoying post-conflict 
peace. The widely held view is that support for entrepreneurship can help these 
countries raise their prosperity and consolidate their peace, and that poverty in these 
countries is partly due to a lack of entrepreneurs. Is this view accurate? The simple 
answer seems to be that entrepreneurship may not automatically improve the peace and 
prosperity in post-conflict states. 
 
Entrepreneurship is however, a ubiquitous quality in fragile and post-conflict states. It is 
not lacking as some would claim. Also, unproductive and destructive entrepreneurship 
implies that the establishment of peace may not automatically result in prosperity, and 
might even cause a relapse into conflict. To prevent unproductive and destructive 
entrepreneurship from derailing peace and prosperity, efforts to increase the supply of   24
entrepreneurship itself may be less important than efforts to change the allocation   
of entrepreneurial effort into productive entrepreneurship. How can this reallocation of 
entrepreneurial initiative be achieved?  
 
In this paper I have suggested that there are at least six dimensions which need to be 
taken into consideration. First, the context of war needs to be taken into account. This 
environment may not only contain the seeds of its future destruction, but also inform 
our understanding of the incentives which affects the behaviour of various sources of 
entrepreneurship. Some of the most significant threats to productive entrepreneurship lie 
in the possibility of a relapse into war, in the myriad new opportunities for rent-seeking, 
in the possibility of regulatory capture by elites, and difficulties in controlling fiscal 
expenditures due to continued high military spending. 
 
Second, the relationship between institutions and entrepreneurship, and the evolution of 
institutional reform need to be better understood. The design of good institutions for 
fragile states and post-conflict states are complex for four main reasons: (i) institutions 
are endogenous and relatively little is known about the co-evolution of institutions, 
entrepreneurial behaviour and a country’s stages of development; (ii) ‘obvious’ policy 
reforms such as property rights, rule of law, etc., may only be a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for development; (iii) institutional reform itself is an ongoing, 
dynamic process which creates uncertainties which can have unwanted outcomes for 
productive entrepreneurship to emerge, such as the entrenchment of former elites and a 
rise in rent-seeking behaviour; (iv) initial conditions may matter for the dynamics and 
success of institutional strengthening.  
 
Third, particular characteristics of entrepreneurship in poor and conflict countries need 
to be taken into consideration, in particular the roles played by ethnic/immigrant 
(minority) and diasporic entrepreneurs. Conflict displaces entrepreneurs, weakening 
their social networks and family bonds. Development of pro-growth entrepreneurship in 
post-conflict societies needs first of all to be able to limit the migration of skilled 
individuals, to mobilize the talent in their émigré population, use their diasporas as 
sources of entrepreneurial finance, to ensure policies for the recruitment of skilled 
labour and skilled entrepreneurs from elsewhere, and to improve conditions for 
immigrant and minority groups. These elements are a side of entrepreneurship support 
that is most often neglected in transition. 
 
Fourth, attention needs to be given to the scope of the market. It must be an objective of 
entrepreneurial support in post-conflict states to improve the capacity of entrepreneurs 
to find markets, and have the means to market and distribute their products and services. 
Three ways in which this can be accomplished are: (i) to invest in transport and trade 
infrastructure, (ii) to further regional trade integration; (iii) and to get small firms to be 
able to export more. Furthermore, many entrepreneurs are already trading significantly 
across borders, perhaps also in illicit goods. It may be important to find novel ways of 
support, and where possible not to criminalize, much of the existing productive (but 
unrecorded) activities of entrepreneurs. 
 
Fifth, human and financial capital requirements are critical inputs into the 
entrepreneurial process, but the kind and type of requirements cannot easily be 
transplanted from other contexts or countries. In fragile states human capital formation 
remains important in general, but on the level of the entrepreneur a twofold emphasis is   25
need, on strengthening general skills and on developing organization and management 
expertise. The latter is needed in light of the need for organizational evolution in fragile 
states. It may very be that traditional owner-managed firms and family/household firms 
in fragile states cannot implement new technologies or adopt strategies to broaden their 
markets, because these are beyond their organizational capabilities. Changes in these 
organizational abilities of firms in fragile states may therefore be an important medium 
to longer term strategy to raise growth. Finance will play an important part in firm 
evolution, although currently there are a number of issues on the modalities of financial 
sector development in post-conflict states that need to be settled. Indeed, a sufficient 
understanding of the role of finance in fragile states and post-conflict states is still 
lacking. Issues on which further research is needed include the clarification of the 
relationship between entrepreneurial skills and finance; the capital requirements for 
start-ups in post-conflict and fragile states; the context-specific forms of finance most 
appropriate in different situations; and the need for funding of high-tech enterprises. 
 
Six, the relationship between government and the private sector in fragile post-conflict 
states need to be put on an appropriate footing, argued to be that of a developmental 
state, wherein governments remove barriers to business development, provide support 
on the input side of the entrepreneurial process and decentralize the provision of support 
measures and economic decision-making as much as possible. 
 
When allocated to pro-growth entrepreneurial ventures, entrepreneurship can contribute 
towards peace and security, and transitions, in fragile and conflict states through a 
number of ways. Entrepreneurs create jobs, provide diversity, assume risk, provide 
goods and services, including even public goods, as well as provide an environment for 
learning, experimentation, innovation and competition. Moreover, entrepreneurs fulfil a 
‘cost discovery’ function in making sunk costs in a new activity which ex ante may or 
may not be profitable, but which will provide information ex post on such profitability 
to other entrepreneurs. In doing so, entrepreneurs provide information on what an 
economy can be good at producing, which in the context of fragile and post-conflict 
states is information that may be fundamentally lacking. Furthermore, entrepreneurs 
generate change from inside the country and its economic system, rather than from the 
outside. By providing vehicles for individual social mobility entrepreneurship can also 
be important for conflict reduction. Entrepreneurship is also a source for what has been 
termed ‘radical innovation’ which is ‘innately destructive of the status quo’ and which 
can undermine vested interests and even ‘crowd out’ rents by providing new and 
substitute opportunities. 
 
Although high-potential, pro-growth entrepreneurship has been stressed, careful 
attention should still be given to forms of entrepreneurship that has less of a growth 
impact, but can still be productive such as informal, lifestyle and survivalist 
entrepreneurs. Although they do not make a significant impact on economic growth this 
sector is supported for social and anti-poverty reasons, specifically through support to 
the high proportion of small and micro-enterprises that proliferate in the aftermath of 
war. Despite certain disadvantages of being small, and having noted that the 
environment in fragile states often inhibits the growth of firms, the fact that most firms 
in fragile states and post-conflict societies are small firms, are not in itself problematic. 
Unshackled from constraints these firms may have the flexibility to utilize opportunities 
that larger firms, including state-owned enterprises and multinational firms, cannot take 
on. However, I argued that despite the potential importance of existing small firms, it   26
may in fact not be in existing firms that the future growth of fragile states and post-
conflict states reside but in the creation of new firms, i.e. start-ups. Start-up firms are 
the ones most likely to grow and to create new jobs. In many transition countries, where 
there were no significant private sectors to start with, new firms often strengthened 
reforms by improving economic conditions. New firms can be important in a transition 
context in a post-conflict society since they are less encumbered with the historic 
influences of such a society as opposed to existing firms which may themselves be 
undergoing reform, and that some form of private sector development could be a 
condition for successful privatization of inefficient state-owned firms. 
 
Finally, despite the useful light that many strands of the existing literature on fragile 
states and entrepreneurship throw on the design of post-conflict entrepreneurial support 
strategies, our understanding of entrepreneurship in such circumstances remain limited 
given that entrepreneurship in fragile states is a significantly under-researched topic. 
The consequent lack of data on entrepreneurship in these countries remains a constraint 
on policy design.  
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